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Argentine debt restructuring
Argentina began a process of debt restructuring on January 14, 2005, that allowed it to resume payment on the majority of the USD 82 billion in sovereign bonds that defaulted in 2002 at the depth of the worst economic crisis in the country's history. A second debt restructuring in 2010 brought the percentage of bonds out of default to 93%, though ongoing disputes with holdouts remained.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Banks Fear Court Ruling in Argentina Bond Debt )〕 Bondholders who participated in the restructuring, accepted repayments of around 30% of face value and deferred payment terms, and began to be paid punctually; the value of their bonds also began to rise.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Billionaire Hedge Funds Snub 90% Returns )〕〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Argentina Bonds Rally Despite Risk )〕〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Argentina Seeks to Restructure Debt Held by Vulture Funds )〕 The remaining 7% of bondholders later won the right to be repaid in full.
As part of the restructuring process, Argentina drafted agreements in which repayments would be handled through a New York corporation and governed by United States law. The holdout bondholders found themselves unable to seize Argentine sovereign assets in settlement, but realized that Argentina had omitted to provide for holdout situations and had instead deemed all bonds repayable on ''pari passu'' (equal) terms that prevented preferential treatment among bondholders. The holdout bondholders therefore sought, and won, an injunction in 2014 that prohibited Argentina from repaying the 93% of bonds that had been renegotiated, unless they simultaneously paid the 7% holdouts their full amount due as well. Together with the agreement's Rights Upon Future Offers ("RUFO") clause, this created a deadlock in which the 93% of renegotiated bondholders could not be paid without paying the 7% holdouts, but any payment to the holdouts would potentially (according to Argentina) trigger the 93% being due repayment at full value too; a sum of around $100 billion which Argentina could not afford.〔(Argentina accuses US of judicial malpractice for triggering needless default ), The Telegraph, 31 July 2014〕 The courts ruled that as Argentina had itself drafted the agreement, and chosen the terms it wished to propose, it could not now claim the terms were unreasonable or unfair, and that this could not be worked around by asserting sovereign status since the injunction did not affect sovereign assets, but simply ruled that Argentina must not give preferential treatment of any group of bondholders over any other group when making repayments.
Subsequently, though Argentina wanted to repay some creditors, the judgment prevented Argentina from doing so, because being forced to repay all creditors, including the holdouts, would have totaled around $100 billion. The country was therefore categorized as being in selective default by Standard & Poor's and in restricted default by Fitch.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Everything you need to know about Argentina’s weird default )〕〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Argentina blames US for debt woes, denies default )〕 The ruling affected New York Law Argentine bonds; Argentine bonds issued under Buenos Aires and European Law were not affected.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=The Muddled Case of Argentine Bonds )〕〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=New York judge allows payment to bondholders in Europe )〕
Proposed solutions include seeking waivers of the RUFO clause from bondholders, or waiting for the RUFO clause to expire at the end of 2014.〔 The dilemma raised concerns internationally about the ability of a small minority to forestall an otherwise-agreed debt restructuring of an insolvent country,〔 and the ruling that led to it was widely criticized both within the United States and internationally.
== Overview ==
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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